Games
with Espionage
Eilon
Solan and Leeat Yariv
Games
and Economic Behavior, to appear.
We consider normal form games in which
two players decide on their strategies before the start of play and Player 1
can purchase noisy information about his
opponent's decisions concerning future
response policies (i.e., spy on his opponent's decision). We give a full
characterization of the set of distributions over the players' payoffs that can
be induced by such equilibria, as well as describe their welfare and Pareto
properties. In 2 × 2 games we find three phenomena that occur in equilibrium:
(i)
when the game
is non-degenerate, the information purchased is independent of its cost.
The cost determines only whether information is purchased or not,
(ii)
the player who
spies treats his information as if it were deterministic, even though it is
correct only probabilistically, and
(iii)
in chain store
models, espionage is used if and only if the perfect equilibrium payoff
differs from the Stackelberg equilibrium payoff with Player 2 being
the Stackelberg leader.