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European Research Council



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Milestones

- [91] Logic programming for static analysis
- [95] nterprocedural Analysis like even software verification, this has been the Holy Grail of computer science for
 - Context free reachability many decades but now in some very key areas,
 - Susan Horwitz & Tom Rep^{for} example, driver verification we're building tools that can do actual proof about the

software and how it works in order to

guarantee the reliability." Bill Gates, April 18,

2002. <u>Keynote address</u> at <u>WinHec 2002</u>

- [03]CSSV: Proving the absence of buffer overrun
 Dor, Rodeh, PLDI'03, Airbus
- [96-] Shape Analysis
 - Reasoning about heap reachability

Panaya Impact Analysis Tool

- •Yossi Cohen and Nurit Dor
- Acquired by Infosys



- TVLA

The Internet: A Remarkable Story

- Tremendous success
 - From research experiment to global infrastructure




- Brilliance of under-specifying
 - Network: best-effort packet delivery
 - Hosts: arbitrary applications
- Enables innovation in applications
 - Web, P2P, VoIP, social networks, virtual worlds
- But, change is easy *only* at the edge... ⊗


Inside the Net: A Different Story...


- Closed equipment
 - Software bundled with hardware
 - Vendor-specific interfaces
- Over specified
 - Slow protocol standardization
- Few people can innovate
 - Equipment vendors write the code
 - Long delays to introduce new features

Impacts performance, security, reliability, cost...




Do We Need Innovation Inside?





- Mallory
- Networks provide end-to-end connectivity
- Just contain host and switches
- All interesting processing at the hosts

Security & Performance




- Security (firewalls, IDSs,...)
- Performance (caches, load balancers,...)
- New functionality (proxies,...)

Middleboxes




- Middleboxes are intermediaries
 - Interposed in-between the communicating hosts
 - Often without knowledge of one or both parties
- Examples
 - Network address translators (NAT)
 - Firewall
 - Traffic shapers
 - Intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
 - Transparent Web proxy caches
 - Application accelerators


NAT




Firewalls



Firewalls







В

Web Clients and Servers

Most Web applications use client-server protocol

Cache


- Client sends a request
- Server sends a response
- Proxies play both roles
 - A server to the client
 - A client to the server



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Two Views of Middleboxes

- An abomination (toevah)
 - Violation of layering
 - Breaks the functional model
 - Responsible for many subtle bugs
- A practical necessity
 - Significant part of the network
 - Solving real and pressing problems
 - Needs that are not likely to go away
 - Local functionality enhancements



Middlebox code can get complex

- Source code complexity
 - Bro Network Intrusion
 - 101,500 lines of C++, Python, Perl, Awk, Lex, Yacc
 - Snort IDS 220,000 C, ...
 - Pfsense 476438 locs of C,php,scripts,...
- Hard to specify correctness
 - What is a correct IDS?

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Programming error

- The middlebox code fails to implement the required functionality
- Incorrect intrusion detection system
 - 10 CVE reports for pfsense in 2014, a popular firewall
 - CVE on Firewall hardware from Palo Alto Networks (2010)
 - Misinterprets HTTP cookie options, etc
- Heartbleed bug
 - allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL software

• Requires code analysis



Hypothesis

- There are only few types of middleboxes
- Can abstract the model of middleboxes as finite state machines

Misconfiguration errors

- Do the topology and the middlebox configuration implement the specification?
- Responsible for 43% of network failures [IMC:RJ13]

[IMC:RJ13] R. Potharaju and N. Jain Demystifying the dark side of the middle: field study of middlebox failures in datacenters The Internet Measurement Conference, 2013

Safety of Computer Networks


- Show that something bad cannot happen
- Early detection of potential bugs

- Isolation:
 - A packet of type t sent from host A never reaches host
 B
 - Isolation between two universities
 - SSH packets from host A cannot reach B


Safety with middleboxes

- Safety can be checked when the network only has switches with static routing rules
 - Trace the forwarding graph
- Middleboxes make everything harder
 - Arbitrary behavior black box
 - Rewrite packet headers
 - Middlebox behave differently over time need to reason about history
 - Composition may violate safety

Firewall Misconfiguration



A is isolated from B



At most one packet from B

Topology Assumptions

- Finite set of hosts H
- Fixed set of middleboxes M
 - Switches are degenerate middleboxes
- Fixed undirected topology $E \subseteq (H \times Pr \times M) \cup (M \times Pr \times Pr \times M)$

Packet Assumptions

- Finite set of packet types T
- Finite set of ports Pr per middlebox
- Finite set of packet headers
 (t, src, dst, pr) ∈ P = T × H × H × Pr
- No bound on the number of packet sent
- Many packets may be sent before a safety violation occurs

Middlebox Abstract Semantics

- The abstract semantics of each middlebox is a function
 - $-m: P^* \times P \rightarrow 2^P = P^* \rightarrow (P \rightarrow 2^P)$
 - Packet bodies are unchanged

Common middleboxes


Middlebox	Function
Switch	$\lambda h, p = \{p[out \mapsto pr\} \mid pr \in PR - p.ip\}$
Firewall	λh, p = if trusted(p, h) then {p[out↦pr} pr ∈ PR − p.ip} // forward else {} // drop
Learning Switch	$\lambda h, p = if there exists pr_0 ∈ Prt such thatconnected(p.dst, h, pr_0)then {p[out → pr_0] } // forwardelse {p[out} → pr :pr ∈ Prt, pr ≠ p.ip} // flood$
IDS	$\lambda h, p = if trusted(p, h)$ then {p[out \mapsto pr} pr \in PR – p.ip} // forward else {} // drop
Cache Proxy	λh, p = if avail(p.body, h, response) then {p[src→me, dst →p.src,body→ response]} else {p[src →me]}

Modeling Middliboxes by FSMs

- A Transducer $\underline{m} = <S, s_0, P, f, \delta >$ where
 - S are the states of the middleboxes
 - $s_0 \in S$ is the initial state
 - $-f: S \times P \rightarrow 2^{P}$ is the current forwarding behavior
 - δ : S × P \rightarrow 2^s is the next state
 - Extend δ to histories
 - $\delta([]) = \{s_0\}$
 - δ (h . p) = δ (δ (h), p))
- <u>m</u> models m: $P^* \times P \rightarrow 2^P$ when for all $h \in P^*$ and $P \in P$:

 $- f(\delta(h), p) = m(h, p)$

Partial FSM for Firewall



The Safety Problem

- Given a fixed topology of middleboxes
- A finite state transducer for each of the middleboxes
- Prove that there exists no scenario of packet transmissions leading to a bad state
- Identify such scenariors

Undecidability

- Checking safety properties such as isolation is undecidable even for finite state middleboxes
 - Cycles in the topology allows counting
 - Even in the absence of forwarding loops

Obtaining Decidability

- Show that if there is a scenario leading to a safety violation then there is also bounded one
- Reduction to a decision procedure


Non-Deterministic Packet Handling

- Assumes that order of packet processing is arbitrary
- It may be that a packet p arrives before q and yet the middlebox processes q first
- If a the network is safe under non-deterministic assumption it is also safe under FIFO assumption
- May lead to false alarms
 - Middlebox can impose orders based on acknowledgements

Decidability

- Under non-deterministic assumptions safety is decidable
- More packets per state means more forwarding options
 - Order is immaterial
 - Terminating backward reachabilty
- Well Quasi-Order on Packet Multisets
- Reduction to Coverability in Petri Net
 - But complexity is high
 - EXPSPACE-Complete

Middlebox classification



Stateless Middleboxs

- Behavior independent of the history

 Can maintain configuration information
- For all h, $h' \in P^*$:
 - -m(h) = m(h')
 - For all $p \in P$: m(h, p) = m(h', p)
- Examples
 - Switches and Routers
 - ACL Firewall
 - Simple load-balancer


Increasing Middleboxs

- For every history, adding packets increase forwarding behavior
- For all h1, h2 \in P* , p, p' \in P: - m(h1:h2, p) \subseteq m(h1:p':h2, p)
- Good examples
 - Stateless
 - Firewall
- Bad Examples
 - Learning Switch
 - Cache

Progressing Middleboxs

- No state reset
- No cycles in the automaton besides self-cycles
- Good examples
 - Learning switches
 - IDS?
 - Cache
- Bad Examples
 - Round-robin load balancer

Middlebox classification



Abstract Middlebox Definition Language

- Powerful enough to express the behavior of interesting middleboxes
- Succinct
 - Sometimes exponential state saving
- Simple enough for analysis
- Lends itself to classification of middleboxes
 - Same worst case complexity
 - But sometimes exponential saving

Firewall (AMDL)


```
firewall(self) =
receive(p, prt)⇒
when prt = 1
trusted_hosts.insert p.dst
forward p to 2
when prt = 2 and p.src ∈ trusted_hosts
forward p to 1
```

Proxy (AMDL)


proxy(self) = **receive**(p, prt) \Rightarrow when $(p.type, response) \in cache$ //stored response **forward** response[src=self.host] **to** prt when (p.type, p.src, p.dst, *rport*) ∈ requested // first response cache.insert (p.type, p); forward p[src = self.host] to port otherwise // new message requested.insert (p.type, p.src, p.dst, prt); **forward** p[src = self.host] **to** oprt **forall** oprt \in AllPrt **and** oprt != pr

Firewall vs. FSM


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```



The MuteVer Toolset




Amazon EC2 Security Groups model



Query

- Q1: can a packet arrive from tenant 7 to private host of faulty tenant, provided that the private host never sent a packet to tenant 7? (YES)
- Q2: can a packet arrive from tenant 7 to private host at tenant 2 (not faulty), provided that the private host never sent a packet to tenant 7? (NO)

Results (muZ)



(Some) Related Work

Dynamic

- Veriflow
 - Online verification
 - Handles dynamic networks pretty well
- Header Space Analysis
 - Offline and online verification

Static

- Firewall Verification
 - Margrave
- SDN
 - Netkat
 - Vericon
- Reductions to Datalog
 - Badfish
 - Checking Beliefs

Summary

- Middlebox classification
- Complexity results
- Initial toolset

Acknowledgments

- The Noun Project
- Nate Foster, Michael Freedman, and Jane Rexford