Eilon Solan

School of Mathematical Sciences  

Department of Statistics and Operations Research 

Ph.D., Mathematics, Hebrew University, 1998. 

M.Sc., Mathematics, Tel-Aviv University, 1993. 

B.Sc., Mathematics and Computer Science, Hebrew University, 1989. 

solan_eilon_1

 

 

Research Areas

 

Game Theory, Stochastic Processes, Measure Theory.

 

Editorial Positions

           

Mathematics of Operations Research: Area Editor for Game Theory.

International Journal of Game Theory: Associate Editor.

Dynamic Games and Applications: Associate Editor.

Transactions Network Optimization and Control: Advisory Board.

 

Books

Game Theory (in Hebrew), with Michael Maschler and Shmuel Zamir. Magness Press. 1006 pages.

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Papers

  1. Discounted Stochastic Games, 1998. Mathematics of Operations Research, 23, 1010-1021. PDF. Abstract.
  2. Three-Player Absorbing Games, 1999. Mathematics of Operations Research, 24, 669-698. PDF. Abstract.
  3. Absorbing Team Games, 2000. Games and Economic Behavior, 31, 245-261. PDF. Abstract.
  4. Stochastic Games with Two Non-Absorbing States, 2000. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 119 , 29-54. PDF. Abstract.
  5. Characterization of Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games, 2001. International Journal of Game Theory, 30, 259-277 PDF. Abstract. The original publication is available on LINK at http://link.springer.de/.
  6. Quitting Games, 2001, with Nicolas Vieille. Mathematics of Operations Research, 26, 265-285. PDF. Abstract.
  7. Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games, 2001, with Rakesh Vohra.  Mathematics of Operations Research, 26, 601-610. PDF. Abstract.
  8. The Dynamics of the Nash Correspondence and n-Player Stochastic Games, 2001. International Game Theory Review, 3, 291-300. PDF. Abstract.
  9. Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies, 2001, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. Probability Theory and Related Fields, 119, 433-451. PDF. Abstract.
  10. Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games, 2002, with Nicolas Vieille, Games and Economic Behavior, 38, 362-399. PDF. Abstract.
  11. Correlated Equilibrium and Public Signalling in Absorbing Games, 2002, with Rakesh Vohra.  International Journal of Game Theory, 31, 91-121. PDF. Abstract. The original publication is available on LINK at http://link.springer.de/.
  12. Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation, 2002, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. The Annals of Statistics, 30, 1178-1193. PDF. Abstract.
  13. Uniform Value in Recursive Games, 2002, with Nicolas Vieille. The Annals of Applied Probability, 12, 1185-1201. PDF. Abstract.
  14. An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games, 2003, with Eran Shmaya and Nicolas Vieille. Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 300-306. PDF. Abstract.
  15. Quitting Games – An Example, 2003, with Nicolas Vieille. International Journal of Game Theory, 31, 365-381. PDF. Abstract. The original publication is available on LINK at http://link.springer.de/.
  16. Perturbed Markov Chains, 2003, with Nicolas Vieille. Journal of Applied Probability, 40, 107-122. PDF. Abstract.
  17. Randomization and Simplification in Dynamic Decision Making, 2003, with Ehud Kalai. Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 251-264. PDF. Abstract. 
  18. Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games, 2003, with Nicolas Vieille. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39, 911-929. PDF. Abstract.
  19. Continuity Properties in Competitive Markov Decision Processes, 2003. Journal of Theoretical Probability, 16, 831-845. PDF. Abstract.
  20. Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring, 2003, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 133-150.  PDF. Abstract. For an earlier version see . PDF. The original publication is available on LINK at http://link.springer.de/.
  21. Games with Espionage, 2004, with Leeat Yariv. Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 172-199. PDF. Abstract.
  22. Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information, 2004, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 43, 86-110. PDF. Abstract. 
  23. Approximating a Sequence of Observations by a Simple Process, 2004, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. The Annals of Statistics, 32. PDF. Abstract. 
  24. Two Player Non Zerosum Stopping Games in Discrete Time, 2004, with Eran Shmaya. The Annals of Probability, 32, 2733–2764. PDF. Abstract.
  25. Zero-Sum Dynamic Games and a Stochastic Variation of Ramsey Theorem, 2004, with Eran Shmaya. Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 112, 319-329.  PDF.
  26. The Value of Zero-sum Stopping Games in Continuous Time, 2005, with Rida Laraki. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,.43, 1913-1922.  PDF. Abstract.
  27. Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information, 2005. Mathematics of Operations Research, 30, 51-72.  PDF. Abstract.
  28. Continuous-Time Games of Timing, 2005, with Rida Laraki and Nicolas Vieille. Journal of Economic Theory, 120, 206-238. PDF. Abstract.
  29. Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements, 2006, with Nicolas Vieille. Economic Theory, 28, 721-726. PDF. Abstract.
  30. Excludability and Bounded Computational Capacity Strategies, 2003, with Ehud Lehrer. Mathematics of Operations Research, 31, 637-648. PDF. Abstract.
  31. The Effects of Anti-Spam Methods on Spam Mail, 2006, with Eran Reshef. CEAS 2006, Mountain View, California. PDF.
  32. Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems, 2007, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. Econometrica, 75, 1591-1611. PDF.
  33. Protocols with No Observations, 2009, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. Operations Research, 57, 905-915.  PDF.
  34. Informational Externalities and Emergence of Consensus, 2009, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 979-994. PDF.
  35. Approachability with Bounded Memory, 2009, with Ehud Lehrer. Games and Economic Behavior. 66, 995-1004. PDF. Abstract.
  36. Games with Constraints with Network Applications, 2009, with Eitan Altman. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 54, 2435-2440. PDF.
  37. Computing Uniform Optimal Strategies in Two-Player Stochastic Games, 2010, with Nicolas Vieille. Economic Theory. 42, 237-253. PDF.
  38. A Sequential Selection Game with Vetoes, 2010, with Steve Alpern and Shmuel Gal. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. PDF.

 

Chapters in Books

39.  Stopping Games – Recent Results, 2004, with Nicolas Vieille. In Advances in Dynamic Games, Birkhaser. PDF.

  1. General Tools - Perturbations of Markov Chains, 2005, Proceedings of the NATO ASI conference on stochastic games. PDF.
  2. Uniform Equilibrium - More Than Two Players, 2005, Proceedings of the NATO ASI conference on stochastic games. PDF.
  3. Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring, 2003, with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille. In Haurie A., Muto S., Petrosjan L.A., and Raghavan T.E.S., Advances in Dynamic Games: Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management. PDF.
  4. Stochastic Games, 2009, in Encyclopedia of Database Systems, Springer. PDF.

 

Work in Progress

1.      On the Optimal Amount of Experimentation in Sequential Decision Problems (2007), with Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille.

2.      Bandit Problems with Levy Payoff Processes (2008), with Asaf Cohen.

3.      Bandit Problems with Levy Infinite Measures (2008), with Asaf Cohen.

4.      Equilibrium in Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Dynkin Games in Continuous Time (2009), with Rida Laraki.

5.      Repeated Sender-Receiver Games (2009), with Jerome Reneault and Nicolas Vieille.

6.      Bounded-Rationality Equilibrium (2009), with Penelope Hernandez.

7.      Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Borel Games (2009), with Ayala Mashiach-Yakovi.

8.      Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Recursvie Games (2009), with Ayala Mashiach-Yakovi.

 

Thesis

  1. Discounted Stochastic Games, 1993. M.Sc. Thesis, Tel Aviv University.
  2. Stochastic Games, 1998. Thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. PDF.

 

E-Mail

e-mail to Eilon Solan at eilons@post.tau.ac.il

 

Last update: November 2009.