

Typos in “Game Theory” by Maschler, Solan and Zamir

Chapter 4

1. On page 120, Case 2, line 6: $\max_{1 \leq l \leq L} u_i^l(s^{*l})$ should be $\max_{1 \leq l \leq L} u_{i_0}^l(s^{*l})$.
2. On page 120, Case 2, line 7: s_i^{*l} should be $s_{i_0}^{*l}$.
3. On page 120, Equation (4.69), the second term from the right should be $u_{i_0}^{l_0}(s^{*l_0})$ (and not $u_i^{l_0}(s^{*l_0})$)

Chapter 5

1. On page 207, Equation (5.154) should read:

$$\left\{ (y, 1 - x, 1 + 2xy) : 0 \leq x, y \leq 1, xy \leq \frac{1}{2} \right\}.$$

Chapter 6

1. On page 234, Equation (6.53) should read

$$\rho_i(x; b_i) = \prod_{l=1}^{L_i^x} \frac{\sum_{s_i \in S_i^*(x_i^{l, a_l})} \sigma_i(s_i)}{\sum_{s_i \in S_i^*(x_i^l)} \sigma_i(s_i)}.$$

Equation (6.54) should read

$$\sum_{s_i \in S_i^*(x_i^{l, a_l})} \sigma_i(s_i) = \sum_{s_i \in S_i^*(x_i^{l+1})} \sigma_i(s_i). \quad (1)$$

2. On Page 220, Example 6.1, Figure 6.1: In this figure, there appear U^1 , U^1 , and U^2 (from left to right). These three terms should be (again, from left to right): U_I^1 , U_{II}^1 , U_I^2 .

Chapter 7

1. On pages 272-273 there are few typos in Example 7.38.
In Figure 7.16, the vertex x_1 is an information set, denoted U_I^1 , information set U_I^1 should be renamed U_I^2 , and information set U_I^2 should be renamed U_I^3 .
Three lines after Equation (7.29), change U_I^1 to U_I^2 .
In Equation (7.27), change U_I^1 to U_I^2 .
In the paragraph that follows Equation (7.27), change U_I^1 to U_I^2 (three times) and U_I^2 to U_I^3 (four times).

Chapter 12

1. On page 489, In Equations (12.106) and (12.107), change “0” to “(0)” (that is, add parentheses around “0” in both equations).
2. On page 502, add the word “monotonically” before the word “nondecreasing” on the fourth line before Theorem 12.58 and on the first line of the statement of Theorem 12.58.
3. On page 512, Exercise 12.19.
 - Part (c): Change the sentence after Equation (12.198) to read as follows: The expected payment of buyer 1 with private value $v_1 \in (0, 1]$ is given by $F_Y(v_1)\mathbf{E}[\beta(W) \mid Y \leq v_1]$. Using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem conclude from this that.
 - Part (f): change this part to the following: What are the conditions that the density function f_1 should satisfy to ensure that the strategy β satisfies the conditions of Theorem 12.23 on page 478?
 - Part (g): Do the computations done so far show that the strategy β is a symmetric equilibrium, or should this issue be checked directly?
 - Throughout the exercise change f_1 to f , F_1 to F , and F_i to F (in the last two lines before part (a) and in Equations (12.197), (12.198), (12.199), (12.200), and (12.201)).
4. On page 514, Exercise 12.27, second line, remove the words “and uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$ ”.

5. On page 516, delete Exercises 12.38 and 12.39.

Chapter 14

1. On page 585, Corollary 14.20, second line, it should be $q \in \Delta(\mathcal{J})$.
2. On Page 591, line 6 from bottom, “game with perfect information” should be “game with perfect recall”.

Chapter 16

- On page 676, Figure 16.4, the point $(0, \frac{7}{2}, \frac{7}{2})$ should be $(\frac{7}{2}, 0, \frac{7}{2})$. On the right-hand half of the figure, one should swap $(7, 0, 0)$ with $(0, 0, 7)$.
- On page 677, Figures 16.6 and 16.7 are fine but they are inconsistent with Figures 16.4 and 16.5 on page 676. To make them consistent, put $(0, 7, 0)$ on the bottom-left vertex of the triangle, put $(7, 0, 0)$ on the bottom-right vertex, and put $(0, 0, 7)$ on the top vertex. Once this is done, change $(\frac{7}{2}, \frac{7}{2}, 0)$ to $(\frac{7}{2}, 0, \frac{7}{2})$, and change $(1, 3, 3)$ to $(3, 3, 1)$.

Chapter 17

- On page 691, line 7, it should be $a\mathcal{C}(N; v) + b \subseteq \mathcal{C}(N; u)$.
- On page 691, line 11, it should be $\frac{1}{a}\mathcal{C}(N; u) - \frac{b}{a} \subseteq \mathcal{C}(N; v)$.
- On page 691, line 12, it should be $\mathcal{C}(N; v) \subseteq a\mathcal{C}(N; v) + b$.
- On page 695, Equation (17.34) replace $\delta_{\{1,3\}}$ with $\delta_{\{2,3\}}$.
- On page 703, Definition 17.21, in the second line replace $i \in N$ with $i \in S$.
- On page 705, third line of the proof of Theorem 17.27, change “imputation” to “allocation”.

- On page 711, the highlighted equation before Equation (17.91) should read

$$\sum_{T \subseteq N} \gamma_T \chi^T = \sum_{T \subseteq N} \alpha_T \chi^T + \sum_{T \subseteq N} \beta_T \chi^T = x + y.$$

- On page 716, three lines above Definition 17.49: change $\varphi(\{i, j\}, w_{\{i, j\}}^x)$ to $\varphi(\{i, j\}; w_{\{i, j\}}^x)$ (semicolon).
- On page 716, Equation (17.117) should read (semicolon):

$$(x_i, x_j) \in \mathcal{C}(\{i, j\}; w_{\{i, j\}}^x)$$

- On page 717, line 4, change $(\{i, j\}, w_{\{i, j\}}^x)$ to $\{i, j\}; w_{\{i, j\}}^x)$ (semicolon).
- On page 739, Equation (17.197) should read:

$$(v(1), v(N) - v(1) - v(3), v(3)).$$

Chapter 19

- On page 787, Theorem 19.14: This theorem should read:
 “Let $(N; v)$ be a coalitional game, let \mathcal{B} be a coalitional structure, let k and l be two players in the same coalition in \mathcal{B} , and let x be an imputation. If (C, y) is a justified objection of player k against player l at x , and if ...”

Chapter 22

- Page 907, Exercise 22.6: Remove part (c). Part (b) should read: In this part we show that the claim in Part (a) cannot be generalized to more than two matchings; that is, it is not true that for every three matchings there are preference relations for which these three matchings are stable. Suppose that the set of men is $M = \{X, Y, Z, W\}$ and the set of women is $\{x, y, z, w\}$. Prove that there are no preference relations to the set of men and the set of women for which the following three matchings

are stable:

$$A_1 : Y - w, Z - z, W - y, X - x, \quad (2)$$

$$A_2 : Z - w, W - z, Y - y, X - x, \quad (3)$$

$$A_3 : X - w, Z - z, Y - y, W - x. \quad (4)$$

- Page 908, Exercise 22.15: Remove the words “Who is the unlucky one?”.

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