Publications & Online Papers
Categories:
- Ergodic theory
- Repeated games
- Bounded recall
- Dynamic programming
- Rational learning and merging
- Mediated talk -- cheap talk through a channel
- Approchability, No-regret strategies, Attainability (vector-payoff games)
- Inspection
- Cooperative games (static, dynamic, fuzzy, with externalities)
- Value of
information
- Comparison of information structures
- The concave integral, Integral for capacities
- Partially-specified probability
- Decision theory
- Interactive epistemology and common priors
- Miscellaneous (Social choice, Voluntary bargaining, Quantum probability, Categorization, Commitment folk theorem, Equilibrium payoffs)
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Ergodic Theory
E. Lehrer and B. Weiss
"An e-free Rohlin lemma," (1982),
Ergodic Theory Dynamical Systems, 2, 45-48.
E. Lehrer
"Topological mixing and uniquely ergodic systems," (1987),
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 57, 239-255.
E. Lehrer and H. Pant
"On strictly ergodic models which are not almost topologically conjugate," (1991),
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 73, 1-15.
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Repeated games
Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
E. Lehrer,
"Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games
with non-observable actions," (1989),
International Journal of Game Theory, 18, 57-89.
E. Lehrer,
"Nash Equilibria of n-player repeated games with
semi-standard information," (1990),
International Journal of Game Theory, 19, 191-217.
E. Lehrer,
"Internal correlation in repeated games," (1991),
International Journal of Game Theory, 19, 431-456.
E. Lehrer,
"On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring," (1992),
International Journal of Game Theory , 20, 211-226.
E. Lehrer,
"Correlated equilibria in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions," (1992),
Mathematics of Operations Research, 17, 175-199.
E. Lehrer,
"Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs," (1992),
Mathematics of Operations Research, 17, 200-224.
Repeated games with incomplete information
E. Lehrer,
"A note on the monotonicity of Vn," (1987),
23, 341-342.
epsilon-Consistent Equilbrium
E. Lehrer and S. Sorin,
"e-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games," (1998),
Intrernational Journal of Game Theory, 27, 231-244.
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
E. Lehrer and L. Yariv,
"Repeated games with incomplete information on one side: The case of different discount factors," (1999),
Mathematics of Operations Research, 24, 204-218.
E. Lehrer and A. Pauzner,
"Repeated games with differential time preferences," (1999),
Econometrica, 67, 393-412.
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Bounded recall
E. Lehrer,
"Repeated games with Bounded Recall Strategies," (1988), Journal of Economic Theory, 46, 130-144.