Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria

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Abstract. We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines. Our results have a crucial dependence on the weights assigned to jobs. We consider arbitrary weights, integer weights, K distinct weights and identical (unit) weights. We look both at an arbitrary schedule (where the only restriction is that a job migrates to a machine which lowers its cost) and specific efficient schedulers (such as allowing the largest weight job to move first).

1 Introduction

As the users population accessing Internet services grows in size and dispersion, it is necessary to improve performance and scalability by deploying multiple, distributed server sites. Distributing services has the benefit reducing access latency, and improving service scalability by distributing the load among several sites. One important issue in such a scenario is how the user chooses the appropriate server. Similar problem occurs in the context of routing where the user has to select one of a few parallel links. For instance, many enterprise networks are connected to multiple Internet service providers (ISPs) for redundant connectivity, and backbones often have multiple parallel trunks.

Users are likely to behave "selfishly" in such cases, that is each user makes decisions so as to optimize its own performance, without coordination with the other users. Basically, each user would like to either maximize the resources allocated to it or, alternatively, minimize its cost. Load balancing and other resource allocation problems are prime candidates for such a "selfish" behavior.

A natural framework to analyze this class of problems is that of non-cooperative games, and an appropriate solution concept is that of Nash Equilibrium [22]. A strategy for the users is at a Nash Equilibrium if no user can gain by unilaterally deviating from its own policy. In this paper we focus on the load balancing problem. An interesting class of non-cooperative games, which is related to load balancing, is congestion games [24] and its equivalent model exact potential games [21].

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Traditionally in Computer Science research has been focused on finding a global optimum. With the emerging interest in computational issues in game theory, the *coordination ratio* [17] has received considerable attention [2, 7, 8, 13, 17, 25]. The coordination ratio is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium (the one with maximum social cost) and the social optimum (an optimal solution with the minimal social cost). One motivation is to show that the gap between a Nash Equilibrium and the optimal solution is in some cases not significant, thus good performance can be achieved even without a centralized control.

In this work we are concerned with the time it takes for the system to converge to a Nash equilibrium, rather than the quality of the resulting allocation. The question of convergence to a Nash equilibrium has received significant attention in the Game Theory literature (see [12]). Our approach is different from most of that line of research in a few crucial aspects. First, we are interested in quantitative bounds, rather than showing a convergence in the limit. Second, we consider games with many players (jobs) and actions (machines) and study their asymptotic behavior. Third, We limit ourselves in this work to a subclass of games that arise from load balancing, for which there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, and thus we can allow ourselves to study only deterministic policies.

Our Model. This paper deals with load balancing (see, [3]). Jobs (players) are allowed to select a machine to minimize their own cost. The cost that a job observes from the use of a machine is determined by the load on that machine. We consider weighted load functions, where each job has a corresponding weight and the load on a machine is sum of the weights of the jobs running on it. Until a Nash Equilibrium is reached, at least one job wishes to change its machine. In our model, similarly to the Elementary Stepwise System (see [23]), at every time step only one job is allowed to move, and a centralized controller decides which job would move in the current time step. By strategy we mean the algorithm used by the centralized controller for selecting which of the competing jobs would move. Due to the selfish nature of jobs, we assume that when a job migrates its observed load is strictly reduced, which we refer to as an *improvement* policy. We also consider the well known case of *best reply* policy, where each job moves to a machine in which its observed load is minimal.

Our Results. We assume that there are n jobs and m machines. We assume that K is the number of different weights, W is the total weight of all the jobs and w_{max} is the maximum weight assigned to a job.

For the general case of unrelated machines we show that the system always converges to a Nash equilibrium. This is done by introducing an order between the different configurations and showing that when a job migrates we move to a "lower" configuration in the order. Bounding the number of configurations by $\min\{[O(\frac{n}{Km}+1)]^{Km}, m^n\}$ derives a general bound. Using a potential base argument we derive a bound of $O(4^W)$ for integer weights, where W is the worse case sum of the weights of the jobs. For the specific strategy that first selects jobs from the most loaded machine we can show an improved bound of $O(mW + 4^{W/m+w_{max}})$.

In the simple case of identical machines and unrestricted assignments we show that if one moves the minimum weight job, the convergence may take an exponential number of steps. Specifically, the number of steps is at least,

$$\frac{(\frac{n}{K})^K}{2(K!)} = \Omega(\Big(\frac{n}{K^2}\Big)^K)$$

for $K = m - 1$. In contrast, we show that if one moves the maximum weight job, and the jobs follow the best reply policy, a Nash Equilibrium is reached in at most n steps. This shows the importance of selecting of the "right" scheduling strategy. We also show that selecting the minimal weight job is "almost" the worst case for identical machines, by demonstrating that any strategy converges in $(\frac{n}{K} + 1)^K$ time steps. We also show that any strategy converges in $O(W + n)$ steps for integer weights. For the Random and FIFO strategies we show that they converge in $O(n^2)$ steps.

For restricted assignment and related machines we bound by $O((W^2 S_{max}^2)/\epsilon$ the convergence time to ϵ-Nash, where no job can benefit more than ϵ from unilaterally migrating to another machine. Using the strategy that schedules first jobs from the most loaded machine we can derive an improved convergence bound. Note that in our setting there always exists an ϵ_{min} such that for any $\epsilon < \epsilon_{min}$ we have that any ϵ-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. For example, in the case of identical machine with integer weights $\epsilon_{min} = 1$.

For K integer weights, we are able to derive an interesting connection between W and K, for the case of identical and related machines. We show that for any set V of K integer weights there is an equivalent set V' of K integer weights such that the maximum weight in V' is at most $O(K(cS_{max}n)^{4K})$ for some positive constant c. The equivalence guarantees that the relative cost of different machines is maintained in all configurations. (In addition, we never need to compute V', but rather it is only used in the convergence proofs.) The equivalence implies that $W = O(Kn(cS_{max}n)^{4K})$. Thus, all bounds that depend on W can depend on $O(Kn(cS_{max}n)^{4K})$.

Related Work. Milchtaich [20] describes a class of non-cooperative games, which is related to load balancing. (In order to make the relations between the models clearer we use the load balancing terminology to describe his work.) The jobs (players) share a common set of machines (strategies). The cost of a job when selecting a particular machine depends only on the total number of jobs mapped to the machine (implicitly, all the weights are identical). However, each job has a different cost function for each machine, this is in contrast to the load balancing model where the cost of all the jobs that map to the same machine is identical. It is shown that these games always possess at least one pure (deterministic) Nash Equilibrium and there exists a best reply improvement strategy that converges in polynomial time. However, for the weighted version of these games there are cases where a pure Nash Equilibrium does not exist. In contrast, we show that any improvement policy converges to a pure Nash Equilibrium in the load balancing setting.

Our model is related to the makespan minimization problem since job moves can be viewed as a sequence of local improvements. The analysis of the approximation ratio of the local optima obtained by iterative improvement appears in [5, 6, 26]. The approximation ratio of a jump (one job moves at a time) iterative improvement has been studied in [10]. In [6] it has been shown that for two identical machines this heuristic requires at most n^2 iterations, which immediately translates to an n^2 upper bound for two identical machines with general weight setting in our model. In [26] they observe that the improvement strategy that moves the maximum weight job converges in n steps.

Some interesting related learning models are stochastic fictitious play [12], graphical games [19], and large population games [14]. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibria in communication networks with selfish users has been investigated in [23]. An analysis of the convergence to a Nash Equilibrium in the limit appears in [1, 4].

Paper organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model. The analysis of unrelated, related and identical machines appears in Section 3, Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. We conclude with Section 6. Due to space limitations some proofs are omitted and can found in [9].

2 Model Description

In our load balancing scenario there are m parallel machines and n independent jobs. Each job selects exactly one machine.

Machines Model. We consider identical, related and unrelated machines. We denote by S_i the speed of M_i. Let S_{min} and S_{max} denote the minimal and maximal speed, respectively. WLOG, we assume that $S_{min} = 1$. For identical and unrelated machines we have $S_i = 1$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$.

Jobs Model. We consider both restricted and unrestricted assignments of jobs to machines. In the unrestricted assignment case each job can select any machine while in the restricted assignment case each job J can only select a machine from a pre-defined subset of machines denoted by $R(J)$.

For a job J, we denote by $w_i(J)$ the weight of J on machine M_i (where $i \in R(J)$) and by $M(J,t)$ the index of the machine on which J runs at time t. When considering identical machines, each job J has a weight $w(J) = w_i(J)$. We denote by W the maximal total weight of the jobs, that is $W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \max_{j \in R(J_i)}\{w_j(J_i)\}$, and by $w_{max} = \max_i \max_{j \in R(J_i)}\{w_j(J_i)\}$ the maximum weight of a job.

We consider the following weight settings: *General weight setting* – the weights may be arbitrary real numbers. *Discrete weight setting* – there are K different integer weights $w_1 \leq \ldots \leq w_K = w_{max}$. *Integer weight setting* – the weights are integers.

Load Model. We denote by $B_i(t)$ the set of jobs on machine M_i at time t. The load of a machine M_i at time t is the sum of the weights of the jobs that chose M_i, that is $L_i(t) = \sum_{J \in B_i(t)} w(J)$, and its normalized load is $T_i(t) = L_i(t)/S_i$. We also define $L_{max}(t) = \max_i\{L_i(t)\}$ and $T_{max}(t) = \max_i\{T_i(t)\}$. The cost of job J at time t is the normalized load on the machine $M(J,t)$, i.e., $T_{M(J,t)}(t)$. We define the *marginal* load with respect to a job to be the load in the system when this job is removed.

System Model. The *system state* consists of the current assignment of the jobs to the machines. The system starts in an arbitrary state and each job has a full knowledge of the system state. A job wishes to migrate to another machine, if and only if, after the migration its cost is strictly reduced. Before migrating between machines, a job needs to receive a grant from the centralized controller. The controller has no influence on the selection of the target machine by a migrating job, it just gives the job a permission to migrate. The above is known in the literature as an Elementary Stepwise System (ESWS) (see [4, 23]). Essentially, the controller serves as a critical section control. The execution is modeled as a sequence of steps and in each step one job changes its machine. Notice that if all jobs are allowed to move simultaneously, the system might oscillate and never ever reach a Nash Equilibrium.

Let $A(t)$ be the set of jobs that may decrease the experienced load at time t by migrating to another machine. When a migrating job selects a machine which minimizes its cost (after the migration), we call to this *best-reply* policy. Otherwise, we call to this *improvement* policy.

The system is said to reach a *pure* (or deterministic) Nash Equilibrium if no job can benefit from unilaterally migrating to another machine. The system is said to reach an ϵ-Nash Equilibrium if no job can benefit more than ϵ from unilaterally migrating to another machine. We study the number of time steps it takes to reach a Nash Equilibrium (or ϵ-Nash equilibrium) for different strategies of ESWS job scheduling.

Scheduling Strategies: We define a few natural strategies for the centralized controller. The input at time t is always a set of jobs $A(t)$ and the output is a job $J \in A(t)$ which would migrate at time t. (For simplicity we assume each job has a unique weight, extension for unrelated machines is possible.) The specific strategies that we consider are:

Random: Selects $J \in A(t)$ with probability $1/|A(t)|$.
Max Weight Job: Selects $J \in A(t)$ such that $w(J) = \max_{J' \in A(T)}\{w(J')\}$.
Min Weight Job: Selects $J \in A(t)$ such that $w(J) = \min_{J' \in A(T)}\{w(J')\}$.
FIFO: Let $E(J)$ be the smallest time t' such that $J \in A(t'')$ for every $t'' \in [t', t]$.
FIFO selects $J \in A(t)$ such that $E(J) = \min_{J' \in A(T)}\{E(J')\}$.
Max Load Machine: Selects $J \in A(t)$ such that $T_{M(J,t)}$ is maximal.

3 Unrelated Machines

In this section we consider the unrelated machines case with the restricted assignment. To show the convergence we define a sorted lexicographic order of the vectors describing the machine loads as follows. Consider the sorted vector of the machine loads. One vector is called "larger" than another if its first (after the common beginning of the two vectors) load component is larger than the corresponding load component of the second vector. Formally, given two load vectors ℓ_1 and ℓ_2, let $s_1 = sort(\ell_1)$ and $s_2 = sort(\ell_2)$ where $sort()$ returns a vector in the sorted order. We define $\ell_1 \succ \ell_2$ if $s_1 \succ s_2$ using a lexicographic ordering, i.e., $s_1[i] = s_2[i]$ for $i < k$ and $s_1[k] > s_2[k]$.

We demonstrate that the sorted lexicographic order of the load vector always decreases when a job migrates. To observe this one should note that only two machine are influenced by the migration of the job J at time t, $M_i = M(J, t)$, where job J was before the migration and $M_j = M(J, t + 1)$, the machine J migrated to. Furthermore $L_i(t) > L_j(t + 1)$, otherwise job J would not have migrated. Also note that $L_i(t) > L_i(t + 1)$ since job J has left M_i. Let $L = \max\{L_i(t + 1), L_j(t + 1)\}$. Since $L < L_i(t)$ one can show that the new machine loads vector is smaller in the sorted lexicographic order than the old machine loads vector. This is summarized in the following claim.

Claim 1. *The sorted lexicographic order of the machine loads vector decreases when a job migrates.*

The above argument shows that any improvement policy converges to a Nash equilibrium, and gives us an upper bound on the convergence time equal to the number different sorted machine loads vectors (which is trivially bounded by the number of different system configurations).

General Weights. In the general case, the number of different system configurations is at most m^n, which derives the following corollary.

Corollary 1. *For any ESWS strategy with an improvement policy, the system of multiple unrelated machines with restricted assignment reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most m^n steps.*

Discrete Weights. For the discrete weight setting, the number of different weights is K. Let n_i be the number of jobs with weight w_i. The number of different configurations of jobs with weight w_i is bounded by $\binom{m+n_i}{m}$. Multiplying the number of configurations for the different weights bounds the number of different system configurations. Since, by definition, $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i = n$, we can derive the following.

Corollary 2. *For any ESWS strategy with an improvement policy, the system of multiple unrelated machines with restricted assignment under the discrete weight setting reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most*

$$\prod_{i=1}^{K} \binom{m+n_i}{m} \leq (c\frac{n}{Km} + c)^{Km},$$

steps for some constant $c > 0$.

Integer Weights. To bound the convergence time for the integer weight setting, we introduce a potential function and demonstrate that it decreases when a job migrates. We define the potential of the system at time t, as $P(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} 4^{L_i(t)}$. After job J migrates from M_i to M_j then we have that $L_i(t) - 1 \geq$

$L_j(t+1)$, since J migrated. Also, since we have integer weights, $L_i(t+1) \leq L_i(t) - 1$. Therefore, the reduction in the potential is at least,

$$P(t) - P(t+1) = 4^{L_i(t)} + 4^{L_j(t)} - [4^{L_i(t+1)} + 4^{L_j(t+1)}] \geq 4^{L_i(t)}/2 \geq 2. \quad (1)$$

Since in the initial configuration we have that $P(0) \leq 4^W$ we derive the following theorem.

Theorem 1. *For any ESWS strategy with an improvement policy, the system of multiple machines under the integer weight setting reaches a Nash Equilibrium in $4^W/2$ steps.*

Next we show that this bound can be reduced to $O(mW + m4^{W/m+w_{max}})$ when using the Max Load Machine strategy.

Theorem 2. *For Max Load Machine strategy with an improvement policy, the system of multiple machines under the integer weight setting reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most $4mW + m4^{W/m+w_{max}}/2$ steps.*

Proof. We divide the schedule into two phases with respect to the maximum load among the machines. The first phase continues until $L_{max}(t) \leq W/m + w_{max}$, and then the second phase starts. At the start of the second phase, at time T, the potential is at most $m4^{L_{max}(T)} \leq m4^{W/m+w_{max}}$. By (1), at every step the potential drops by at least two, therefore the length of the second phase is bounded by $m4^{W/m+w_{max}}/2$. Thus, it remains to bound the length of the first phase, namely T. At any time $t < T$ we have $L_{max}(t) > W/m + w_{max}$, which implies that $L_{min}(t) \leq W/m$. Therefore every job in the maximum loaded machine can benefit by migrating to the least loaded machine. The Max Load Machine strategy will choose one of those jobs. By (1), the decrease in the potential is at least $4^{L_{max}(t)}/2 \geq P(t)/2m$. Therefore, after T steps we have $P(T) \leq P(0)(1 - 1/2m)^T$. Since $P(0) \leq 4^W$ and $P(T) \geq 1$, it follows that $T \leq 4mW$, which establishes the theorem. □

Two Weights. It is worth to note that for the special case of two different weights there exists an efficient ESWS strategy the converges in linear time.

4 Related Machines

In this section we consider the related machines. We first consider restricted assignments and assume that all jobs follow an *improvement* policy. We define the potential of the system as follows:

$$P(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{(L_i(t))^2}{S_i} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{w_j^2}{S_{M(j,t)}} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} S_i(T_i(t))^2 + \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{w_j^2}{S_{M(j,t)}}$$

The following lemma shows that the potential drops after each improvement step.

Lemma 1. *When a job of size w migrates from machine i to machine j at time t then $P(t+1) - P(t) = 2w(T_j(t+1) - T_i(t)) < 0$.*

We now like to bound the drop in the potential in each step. Clearly, if we are interested in ϵ-Nash equilibrium, then the drop is at least $2w\epsilon > \epsilon$. Considering a Nash equilibrium, for integer weights and speeds the the drop is at least $(S_{max})^{-2}$. Since the initial potential is bounded by W^2, we can derive the following Theorem.

Theorem 3. *For any ESWS strategy with an improvement policy, the system of multiple related machines with restricted assignment reaches an ϵ-Nash Equilibrium in at most $O(\frac{W^2}{\epsilon})$ steps, and reaches a Nash Equilibrium, assuming both integer weights and speeds, in at most $O(W^2 S_{max}^2)$ steps.*

For unrestricted assignment, by forcing to move the job from the most loaded machine we can improve the bound as follows.

Theorem 4. *Max Load Machine strategy with best reply policy reaches an ϵ-Nash Equilibrium in at most*

$$O(W\sqrt{mS_{max} + \frac{nw_{max}^2}{\epsilon}})$$

steps.

Discrete Weights. We show that for any K integer weight there is an equivalent model in which w_{max} is bounded by $O(K(S_{max}n)^{4K})$, and therefore $W = O(Kn(S_{max}n)^{4K})$. This allows us to translate the results using W to the discrete weight model by replacing W by $O(Kn(S_{max}n)^{4K})$. (We do not need to calculate the equivalent weights, since they are only used for the convergence time analysis.) We first define what we mean by an equivalent set of weights.

Definition 1. *Two discrete set of weights $w_1, \ldots, w_K$ and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K$ are equivalent if for any two assignments, $n_1, \ldots, n_K$ and $\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_K$ we have $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i w_i > \sum_{i=1}^{K} \ell_i w_i$ if and only if $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i \alpha_i > \sum_{i=1}^{K} \ell_i \alpha_i$, and $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i w_i = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \ell_i w_i$ if and only if $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i \alpha_i = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \ell_i \alpha_i$. (We require that both $\sum_{i=1}^{K} n_i \leq n$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{K} \ell_i \leq n$.)*

Intuitively, the above definition says that as long as we use only comparisons, we can replace $w_1, \ldots, w_K$ by $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K$. Most important for us is that we can use in the potential the α's rather than the w's. From the definition of an equivalent set of weights we can derive the following. Any strategy based on comparisons of job weights and machine loads and an improvement policy based on comparisons of machine loads (e.g. best reply) would produce the same sequence of job migrations starting from any initial configuration.

The following theorem, which is proven using standard linear integer programming techniques, bounds the size of the equivalent weights.

Theorem 5. *For any discrete set of weights $w_1, \ldots, w_K$ there exist an equivalent set of weights $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K$ such that $\alpha_K \leq K(cS_{max}n)^{4K}$ for some constant $c > 0$.*

Unit Weight Jobs. We show that for unit weight jobs, there exists a strategy that converges in mn steps. The unit weight jobs is a special case of [20] with a symmetric cost function, where was derived an upper bound of $O(mn^2)$ on the convergence time of a specific strategy. We follow the proof of [20] and obtain a better bound in our model.

Theorem 6. *There exists an ESWS strategy with an improvement policy such that the system of multiple related machines with restricted assignment reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most mn steps in the case of unit weight jobs.*

The next theorem presents a lower bound of $\Omega(mn)$ on the convergence time of some ESWS strategy (different from that of Theorem 6).

Theorem 7. *There exists an ESWS strategy with an improvement policy such that for the system of multiple related machines with unrestricted assignment, there exists a system configuration that requires at least $\Omega(mn)$ steps to reach a Nash Equilibrium in the case of unit weight jobs.*

5 Identical Machines

In this section we will show improved upper bounds that apply to identical machines with unrestricted assignment. We also show a lower bound for K weights which is exponential in K. The lower bound is presented for the Min Weight Job policy. Clearly, this lower bound also implies a lower bound in all the other models. First we derive some general properties. The next observation states the minimal load cannot decrease.

Observation 1. *At every time step the minimal load among the machines either remains the same or increases.*

Now we show that when a job moves to a new machine, this machine still remains a minimal marginal load machine for all jobs at that machine which have greater weight.

Observation 2. *If job J has migrated to its best response machine M_i at time t then M_i is a minimal marginal load machine with regard to any job $J' \in B_i(t)$ such that $w(J') \geq w(J)$.*

Next we show that once a job has migrated to a new machine, it will not leave it unless a larger job arrives.

Claim 2. *Suppose that job J has migrated to machine M at time t. If $J \in A(t')$ for $t' > t$ then another job J' such that $w(J') > w(J)$ switched to M at time t'', and $t < t'' \leq t'$.*

Next we present an upper bound on the convergence time of Max Weight Job strategy. (A similar claim (without proof) appears in [26].)

Theorem 8. *The Max Weight Job strategy with best response policy, for the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most n steps.*

Proof. By Claim 2, once the job has migrated to a new machine, it will not leave it unless a larger job arrives. But under Max Weight Job strategy only smaller jobs can arrive in the subsequent time steps, so each job stabilizes after the first migration, and the theorem follows. □

Now we present a lower bound for the Min Weight Job strategy.

Theorem 9. *For the Min Weight Job strategy with best response policy, for the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment, there exists a system configuration that requires at least $(\frac{n}{K})^K/(2(K!))$ steps to reach a Nash Equilibrium, where $K = m - 1$.*

We also present a lower bound of $n^2/4$ on the convergence time of Min Weight Job and FIFO strategies for the case of two machines.

Theorem 10. *For the Min Weight Job and FIFO strategies with best response policy, for the system of two identical machines with unrestricted assignment, there exists a system configuration that requires at least $n^2/4$ steps to reach a Nash Equilibrium.*

Proof. Consider the following scenario. There are $n/2$ classes of jobs $C_1, \ldots, C_{n/2}$ and each class contains exactly 2 jobs and has weight $w_i = 3^{i-1}$. Notice that a job in C_i with weight $w_i = 3^{i-1}$ has weight equal to the total weight of all the jobs in the first $i-1$ classes plus 1.

Initially, all jobs are located at the same machine. We divide the schedule into *phases*. Let C_j^i we denote all jobs from classes $C_j, \ldots, C_i$. A *k-phase* is defined as follows. Initially, all jobs from classes C_1^k are located at one machine. During the phase these jobs, except one job from C_k, migrate to the other machine. Thus, the duration of a k-phase is $2k-1$. It is easy to see that the schedule consists of the phases $n/2, \ldots, 1$ for Min Weight Job strategy. One can observe that FIFO can generate the same schedule, if ties are broken using minimal weight. □

The following theorem shows a tight upped bound of $\Theta(n^2)$ on the convergence time of FIFO strategy.

Theorem 11. *For FIFO strategy with best response policy, the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment reaches a Nash Equilibrium in at most $n(n+1)/2$ steps.*

Similarly to FIFO, we bound the expected convergence tome of Random strategy by $O(n^2)$.

Theorem 12. *For Random strategy with best response policy, the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment reaches a Nash Equilibrium in expected time of at most $n(n+1)/2$ steps.*

Discrete Weights. For the discrete weight case, we demonstrate an upper bound of $O((n/K+1)^K)$ on the convergence time of any ESWS strategy, showing that the bound of Theorem 9 for the Min Weight Job is not far from the worst convergence time.

Theorem 13. *For any ESWS strategy with best response policy, the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment under the discrete weight setting reaches a Nash Equilibrium in $O((n/K+1)^K)$ steps.*

Integer Weights. For the integer weight case, we show that the convergence time of any ESWS strategy is proportional to the sum of weights.

Theorem 14. *For any ESWS strategy with best response policy, the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment under the integer weight setting reaches a Nash Equilibrium in $W+n$ steps.*

Unit Weight Jobs. For the unit weight jobs, we present a lower bound on the convergence time of a specific strategy.

Theorem 15. *There exists an ESWS strategy with the improvement policy for which the worst case number of steps for the system of multiple identical machines with unrestricted assignment and unit weight jobs to reach a Nash Equilibrium is at least $\Omega(\min\{mn, n\log n \frac{\log m}{\log\log n}\})$ steps.*

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have studied the online load balancing problem that involves selfish jobs (users). We have focused on the number of steps required to reach a Nash Equilibrium and established the convergence time for different strategies. While some strategies provably converge in polynomial time, for the others the convergence time might require an exponential number steps.

In the real world, the convergence time is of high importance, since even if the system starts operation at a Nash Equilibrium, the users may join or leave dynamically. Thus, when designing distributed control algorithms for systems like the Internet, the convergence time should be taken into account.

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