Probabilistic aspects of economic games

Prof. Boris Tsirelson, School of Mathematical Sciences.
Time and place
Monday 13-14 Naftali 208; Wednesday 3-5 Schreiber 210.
Probability theory.
Grading policy
Written homework and oral exam.


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For printing: Postscript or PDF.

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Lecture notes

  1. Basic models and notions:
    game, strategy, best response, equilibrium.
  2. Best response.
  3. Symmetric equilibria and revenue equivalence.
  4. Oligopoly: Cournot competition as a game of incomplete information.
  5. Not just two players.
  6. Symmetric and asymmetric.
  7. Many players, entry cost, and non-robustness.
  8. Unknown distributions, correlated signals.
  9. The end of monotone equilibria.
  10. Contests: a mixed strategy equilibrium.