Class in Auctions and Mechanism Design 2013/2014


Amos Fiat (fiat@tau.ac.il)
2nd Semester, 2013/14 - Tuesday 1600-1900.



 

See latest version of book by Jason Hartline here.

 

See book by Anna Karlin and Yuval Peres here.

 

Presentations:

 

·         Lectures 1-2: Arrows Theorem, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Quasi Linearity, VCG

·         Lecture 3: Bayes Nash Implementation

·         Lecture 4: Unit Demand Bidders, Bayesian Approximation, Prophet Inequality

 

See talks by Jason Hartline at the Carnegie Mellon summer school on algorithmic economics here.

 

In fact, you should listen to all 27 hours of talks at the summer school.

 

Most relevant to auctions are the (multiple) talks by Jason Hartline, Costas Daskalakis, and Eva Tardos, but hear them all.  

 

See talk by Eva Tardos

 

Template for scribe notes here.

 


 

 

Papers:

 

Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue

Jason Hartline Darrell Hoy Sam Taggart

 

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier

 

 

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings

Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg,  Azarakhsh Malekian

 

Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing

Yang Cai, Connstantinos Daskalakis

 

Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis

 

Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions

Yang Cai, Zhiyi Huang

 

Sequential Auctions and Externalities

Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos

 

Composable and Efficient Mechanisms

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

 

Bayesian Sequential Auctions

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

 

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

 

The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos

 

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

 

Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders

SAYAN BHATTACHARYA, ELIAS KOUTSOUPIAS, JANARDHAN KULKARNI, STEFANO LEONARDI, TIM ROUGHGARDEN, XIAOMING XU,

 

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See previous year class