Seminar in Auctions and Mechanism Design -

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Amos Fiat (fiat@math.tau.ac.il)
2nd Semester, 2013/2014 - Wednesday 16:00-18:00, Orenstein 111

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Assigned Talks

1. LiEl - Intro

2. Sally - Characterization

3. Liran – Revenue Equivalence

4. Tal – Bundles Correlated items

5. Gil – Allocation and Pricing

6. Idan – Characterization II

7. David – Myerson Optimal Auction

8. Alon – Optimal Mechanisms (again)

9. Ophir – Symmetric and Asymmetric equilibrira

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References

Jason Hartline:

· Mechanism Design and Approximation

· Equilibrium

· Optimal Mechanisms

· Bayesian Approxmiation

· Prior-independent Approximation

Anna Karlin and Yuval Peres:

· Game Theory, Alive

Noam Nisan:

· Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions

Silvio Micali and Michael Rabin:

Cryptography Miracles, Secure Auctions,

Matching Problem Verification

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Assigned Talks

Introduction, Amos Fiat, Feb 19, 2014.