Ilan Eshel
Professor emeritus
Department of Statistics and Operations Research
School of Mathematical Sciences
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978
Phone: +972 3 6409621
Email: illan@post.tau.ac.il
________________________________________
Research Interests:
• theoretical population biology
• genetic
population dynamics
• population
game dynamics
• evolution
of animal behavior with emphasize on altruistic cooperation
Publications
On the Evolutionary Effect of Recombination
Theor. Pop. Biol. 1, 88-100 (1970).
I. Eshel
On the Evolution in a Population with an Infinite Number of
Theor.
Pop. Biol. 2, 209-36 (1970).
On the Neighbor Effect and the
Evolution of Altruistic Traits
Theor. Pop. Biol. 3, 258-77 (1971).
Evolution
Processes with Continuity of Types
Advances in App. Prob. 4, 475-507 (1971).
Clone Selection
and the Evolution of Modifier Genes
Theor. Pop. Biol. 4:2, 196-208 (1972).
Evolution in
Diploid Populations with Continuity of Gametic
Advances in App. Probab. 5, 55-65 (1972)
Clone Selection
and Optimal Rate of Mutation
Jour. of App. Probab. 10, 728-37 (1973).
I. Eshel
Selection
on Sex-Ratio and the Evolution of Sex-Determination
Heredity 34, 351-61 (1974).
I. Eshel
Stochastic
Selection and the Evolution of Dominance
Theor. Pop. Biol. 9:2, 282-97 (1975).
I. Eshel and D. Cohen
Altruism,
Competition and Kin - Selection in Populations.
Population
Genetics and Ecology, ed. S. Karlin and
Academic Press,
On the Founder
Effect and the Evolution of Altruistic Traits
Theor. Pop. Biol. 10:3, 276-302 (1976).
The Founder
Effect - An Ecogentical Approach
Theor. Pop. Biol. 11:3, 410-24 (1977).
G. Oster,
Worker-Queen
Conflict and the Evolution of Social Insects
Theor. Pop. Biol. 12, 264-90 (1978).
On a Prey
Predator Non-Zero-Sum Game and the Evolution of Gregarious
Am. Nat. 112:978, 787-96 (1978).
On the Mutual
Maintenance of Polymophism in Two Non - Epistatic
Theor. Pop. Biol. 13:1, 99-111 (1978).
I. Eshel
On
the Handicap Principle - A Critical Defense
Jour. Theor. Biol. 70, 245-50 (1978).
Sexual Selection,
Population Density and Availability of Mates
Theor. Pop. biol. 16:3, 301-14 (1979).
On the Survival
Probability of a Slightly Advantageous Mutant
Gene with a
General Distribution of Progeny Size - A Branching
Jour. Math. Biol. 12, 355-62 (1981).
Kin Selection and
Strong Evolutionary Stability of Mutual Help
Theor. Pop. Biol. 19, 420-33 (1981).
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and
Viability Selection in
Theor. Pop. Biol. 22:2, 204-17 (1982).
On Evolutionary
Genetic Stability of the Sex Ratio
Theor. Pop. Biol. 21:3, 430-39 (1982).
On the Evolution of Sex Determination and the Sex
Ratio in
Theor. Pop. Biol. 21, 22, 3 440-50 (1982).
I. Eshel and L.L. Cavalli-Sforza
Assortment of
Encounters and Evolution of Cooperativeness
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 79, 1331-35 (1982).
On the Theory of
Parent - Offspring Conflict: A Two - Locus
Am. Naturalist 119, 285-92 (1982).
Evolutionary and
Continuous Stability
Jour. Theor. Biol. 108, 99-111 (1982).
Coevolutionary Instability of
Mixed Nash Solutions
Jour. Math. Biol. 18, 123-33 (1983).
On the Survival
Probability of a
Slightly Advantageous Mutant
Gene in a Multitype Population:
A Multiple Branching Process
Jour. Math. Biol. 19, No. 2, 200-09 (1983).
On the Evolution
of an Inner Conflict
Jour. Theor. Biol. 108, 65-76 (1984).
Are Intragametic
Conflicts Common in Nature? Do They Represent an
Important Factor in Evolution?
Jour. Theor. Biol. 108, 159-62 (1984).
Parent -
Offspring Correlation in Fitness Under Fluctuating
Proc. Royal Soc. Lond. B 222, 1-14 (1984).
Initial Increase
of New Mutants and Some
Continuity Properties
Am. Nat. 124 (5), 631-40 (1984).
Evolutionary
Genetic Stability of Mendelian Segregation
and the Role of Free
Recombination
Am. Nat. 125 (3), 412-20 (1985).
On the Evolution of an Optimal Rate of Sexual Reproduction.
Am. Nat. 130:5,
758-774 (1987).
Sexual Reproduction and Viability of Future Offspring.
Am. Nat. 130:5,
775-787 (1987).
Cooperation in a Repeated Game with Random Payment Function.
J. App. Prob. 25, 478-491 (1987).
The Three
Brothers' Problem - Kin Selection with More Than One
Potential Helper:I. The
Case of Immediate Help.
Am. Nat. 132 (4), 567-575 (1988).
The Three
Brothers' Problem - Kin Selection with More Than One
Potential Helper:II. The
Case of Delayed Help.
Am. Nat. 132 (4), 550-566 (1988).
I. Eshel, D. Weinshall and U. Motro
On
the Evolution of Altruistic Cooperation.
In
L.M. Ricciardi (ed.), Biomathematics and Related
Computational
Problems 279-282. Kluwer Academic Publications (1988).
On the moulding of senescence by natural selection in sexual and
partly
J. of Genetics 69, 33-44 (1990).
U. Liberman, M.W.
Feldman, I. Eshel, S. Otto
Two locus autosomal sex determination: On the evolutionary genetic
stability of the even sex ratio.
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 87, 2013-2017 (1990).
I. Eshel, E. Sansone
On the evolution of age dependent allocation of reproductive resources.
Publications of the
The handicap
principle in parent-offspring conflict: Comparison of
optimality and
population-genetic analyses.
Am. Nat. 137(2), 167-187 (1991).
Parent offspring
conflict over the sex ratio in a diploid population with
different investment in male and
in female offspring.
On the
Evolutionary Genetic Stability of an Even Sex Ratio in Two
Locus, Autosomal System of Sex Determination.
In "Game Equilibrium Models", Vol. I: Evolution and Game Dynamics, R.
Selten (ed.), Srpinger Verlag, Berlin (1991).
Game theory and
population dynamics in complex genetical systems: The
role
of sex in short-term and in
long-term evolution.
In "Game Equilibrium Models", Vol. I: Evolution and Game Dynamics, R.
Selten (ed.), 6-28, Srpinger Verlag, Berlin (1991).
Sex ratio in the
social hymenoptera: a population genetic study of long
Parent offspring
conflict over the sex ratio. II.
Offspring's response to
Am. Nat. 143 (6), 987-1006 (1994).
I. Eshel, D. Weinshall
and E. Sansone
What risk whould a selfish partner take in order to save the life of
a
non-relative, selfish friend? -
A stochastic game approach to the
prisoner's dilemma. In 'Social
Dilemmas and Cooperatio', eds. U. Schulz, W. Albers
and U. Mueller. Springer-Verlag, New York, Berlin (1994).
Owner-intruder
conflict, Grafen effect and self assessment: The
Bourgeois
principle re-examined.
Jour.Theor.Biol. 177, 341-356 (1996).
On the changing
concept of population stability as a reflection of a
changing problematics
in the quantitative theory of evolution.
J. Math. Biol. 34, 485-510 (1996).
I. Eshel, U. Motro
and E. Sansone.
Continuous stability and long-term convergence.
Jour.Theor.Biol. 185, 333-343 (1997).
I. Eshel, M. Feldman and A. Bergman.
Long-term
Evolution, Short-term Evolution, and Population
Genetic
Theory. Jour.Theor.Biol. 191 (4), 391-396 (1998).
Canalisation, genetic
assimilation and pre-adaptation:
a quantitative
genetic model. Genetics 149: 2119-2133 (1998).
I. Eshel, L. Samuelson and A. Shaked
Altruists Egoists
and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model
American
Economic review, 88: 157-179 (1998).
I. Eshel, E. Sansone
and A. Shaked.
The emergence of
kinship behavior in structured populations of
unrelated individuals.
International Journal of Game Theory, 28:
.
I. Eshel, D. Hereiner,
L. Samuelson, E. Sansone and A. Shaked.
Cooperation, Mimesis and Local Interaction.
Sociological
Methods and Research, 28: 341-364 (2000).
I. Eshel, I. Volovik
and E. Sansone.
On Fisher-Zahavi's handicapped sexy son.
Evolutionary Ecology Research 2, 509-523 (2000).
Partnership. Jour.Theor.Biol. 208, 457-474 (2001).
Optimisation and
evolutionary stability under short-term and long-term
selection.
In 'Adaptationism and optimality', eds E. Sober and
S. Orzack, 161-190, Cambridge University Press (2001).
The volunteer
dilemma I: A continuous time model.
Selection 1: (1-3) 57-66 (2001).
Individual
selection and altruistic relationships:the
legacy of W.D. Hamilton.
Theor. Pop. Biol. 59, 15-20 (2001).
Multiple asymmetry and concord resolution of a conflict.
Jour.Theor.Biol. JTB 213/2. 209-222 (2002).
I. Eshel, E. Sansone
and F. Jacobs
A long-term
genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference - the theories of
Fisher and Zahavi re-examined.
Jour.Math.Biol. 45, 1-21 (2002).
Evolutionary and
dynamic stability in continuous population games
Jour.Math.Biol. 46, 445-459 (2002).
Hadany, L., I. Eshel, and U. Motro.
No place like home: Competition, dispersal, and complex
adaptation. J. Evol. Biol. 17,
.
Asymmetric
population games and the legacy of Maynard
Smith: from evolution to game theory and back? Theor. Pop. Biol. 68. 11-17 (2005).
.
Evolutionarily
stable strategies and short-term selection in mendelian populations
revisited. Theor. Pop. Biol. 70: 76-81 (2006).
I. Eshel, E. Sansone
and A. Shaked.
Gregarious behavior of an evasive prey. J. Mat. Biol. 52, 595-216 (2006).
Hadani, L. T. Beker, I. Eshel and M. Feldman.
On the evolution of stress. Proc. Royal Soc B. (2006).
I. Eshel, E. Sansone
and A. Shaked.
On
the evolution of group-escape strategies of selfish prey.
Theor.
Pop. Biol. 80:: 150-157 (2011).
I. Eshel
Short-
and long-term evolution.
In
'Advances in Adaptive Dynamics', eds U. Diekman and
H.
(IIASA, in press).